Political Marketing Group Newsletter

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Newsletter – September 2016

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2016 Elections

Selling ‘hope’ in a Post-Truth Age:
initial thoughts on the UK’s EU referendum campaign

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Everything has changed in the UK, some argue. We are to leave the EU, there was a short crisis at the heart of government, the opposition party are in meltdown and society appears to be incredibly divided.

How can political marketing help understand this situation. In terms of the campaign it appears that the wrong people tried to sell a product using the wrong message for a majority of UK citizens. The 51.8% wanted to ‘give a finger’ to the elite choir supporting Stronger In Europe, and disregarded the economic argument completely. Given the ‘Leave’ voters tended to be older, less well educated, on lower incomes and in deprived communities one can hypothesise that these people felt their personal economic situation was unlikely to worsen so why listen to the business leaders, bankers and politicians.

In contrast the combination of simple emotional messages regarding ‘taking the country back’ and controlling borders worked. It chimed with long standing Eurosceptic prejudices, media narratives and a general dissatisfaction with UK governance. The Leave campaign encapsulated the post truth age. The broad claims regarding sovereignty and immigration were nebulous in themselves. More specific promises that the £350 billion payments to the EU would be ploughed into the NHS were dismissed as campaign tools as soon as the result was announced.

Any good student of advertising and marketing can tell what went wrong. The 52% could quite happily look at the array of experts arguing the UK was stronger in the EU and think ‘they would say that wouldn’t they’. Value expectancy theory argues that an individual’s circumstances govern behaviour. If they feel that those trying to direct their behaviour are fundamentally not on their side they will dismiss the argument and the spokesperson. This seems to have happened with Stronger In.

Leaving the EU was a leap into the dark, a leap of faith, but that is what the Leave campaign peddled. None of them were in power, although for a short time it seemed Boris Johnson was in striking distance of 10 Downing Street throughout the campaign he presented himself as a political outsider. As an outsider he sold hope. In a rousing finale to a somewhat fractious debate Johnson argued Britain must not be shackled to the corpse that is the EU, bellowing ‘let’s make June 23rd our Independence day’. What independence
would look like was unclear, but it had a ring to it. Ironically in most train stations around the country that week was a poster with Independence Day reminding commuters of that phrase. The poster was for a film but did it matter if the words connected dots in the minds of disgruntled citizens.

Boris, Nigel Farage and others portray themselves as being on the side of the ordinary man and women. Their words struck a chord that the elite figures were unable to.

So what could Stronger In have done to combat this? What they failed to sell is a positive and emotionally resonant reason for the UK to be part of the EU. Rather they tried to scare citizens into voting to remain by piling on threat after threat predicting economic collapse, World War Three and general social Armageddon. Scholars of political advertising will know that fear works, providing the threat is perceived as real and there is a viable alternative. The threat seems to have been dismissed as easily by citizens as by the Leave campaign whose famous phrase ‘we’ve had enough of experts’ captures neatly their approach to campaigning. Hope versus fear, competing versions of the truth, outrageous claims and reporting public opinion as fact characterised both sides.

So what do we learn? Easy. The simple, believable, hopeful message from the person most credible to the least sophisticated analyst of politics won the day. The complex and doom laden scenario was dismissed. The more complex job of marketing a beneficial exit falls to some of the most ardent campaigners for leaving, a job it seems none of them want. For this small group of Conservative politicians it seems they were the turkeys voting in favour of being Christmas dinner. The impact more broadly on the UK is still unknown.
A big marketing problem candidates face in the United States is that, with so many elections, voters become disinterested and turnout drops. For example, New Hampshire has four elections in a presidential election year. We host the first presidential primaries in February, town elections and meetings throughout the Spring, the last in the nation to host non-presidential primaries, in late September, and the general election campaign until the first Tuesday in November. It’s a lot of democracy in a short time and all of these elections are important for something and to somebody. After the presidential primary, the town elections and meetings decide things like town budget priorities and size, and can partly determine town tax rates as well as town regulations. While these seem like obscure matters, they are not if your town does something that adversely impacts you. Following the town elections, there is a quieter period, where the electoral action is elsewhere, but it never really stops. There really is no off season if one lives in a swing state like New Hampshire during a presidential election year. Once the nomination is secured, back come the victorious candidates to begin their general election campaigns at the presidential level, while simultaneous to this there are nominating contests for everything from county sheriff to United States senator that are decided in the middle of September. Finally, there is the sprint to the finish and the whole thing goes away until the next town elections four months later. With so much democracy in a very short period of time it is not surprising that voters grow weary of the entire thing. We are bombarded with fliers, phone calls, door knocks, and paid media from the spring of 2015 until election day a year and a half later.

One way political brands are enhanced and audience attention is held is via the staging of events. Without a clear brand, and a slate of events to promote it, it is difficult for a campaign to stand out in a crowded marketplace. This is complicated by the lack of uniformity in American political branding. Not every campaign does the same things, even within the same party. There is currently a GOP State Senate nominee whose campaign color scheme roughly corresponds to the colors of the Irish Tricolor; the GOP US Senate nominee uses a color scheme of blue and green, but no red; and Donald Trump has his own visual version of the Republican brand. It’s all very confusing for the voter. One of the ways to cut through the clutter is through the use of focusing events that bring the brand to life for the voter. Events in general are very much a visible representation of the brand and one that...
voters can experience. For example, a Hillary Clinton primary event had a very different feel from a John Kaisch event and both differed from the way Donald Trump events were staged and presented. Trump, like Bernie Sanders, seems to be aiming for a big arena, big crowd type of event to enhance his credibility. Campaigns do events because they can engage the voters, generate earned media and raise interest.

Consider the Hillary Clinton-Bernie Sanders event at Portsmouth High School in July. This event shows a candidate event can be a key part of the marketing and brand education effort in a campaign, even during what used to be a dead period. In this event, Clinton sought to get attention during a dead period, reach out to the losing candidate’s voters, as well as energize and expand her support base. This event generated a huge crowd, national media, and a ton of buzz. There were long lines to get into the event and some of the people attending brought signs or were wearing candidate branded merchandise. There were street vendors hawking merchandise for both candidates, including hats, t-shirts, bumper stickers, and buttons. A long line of potential voters is also a long line of potential merchandise consumers and a potential gold mine for the campaign or the entrepreneurially minded. The event was presented in a large high school gymnasium in the most politically progressive city on the Seacoast: Portsmouth. Portsmouth is located just over an hour from Boston or Portland, Maine, and a few hours from Senator Sanders’ home state of Vermont. Thus, it was easy to get a large crowd of interested folks to attend on what would normally be a good beach day. The event went off without a hitch, with one of the most impressive parts of it being the way the campaign staff worked to make sure everyone who could fit into the building did. The crowd itself was made up of a combination of bitter Sanders supporters, persuadable Sanders supporters, Hillary supporters and some protesting Republicans and Libertarians. The event featured a stage with a podium with a “Stronger Together” sign on its front, a huge American flag as a backdrop, with signs reading “Stronger Together” in the light shade of blue that the Clinton team seems to have developed as a rebuttal to the more darker, commanding shade of blue used by the Trump team. The event featured speeches in which Sanders endorsed Clinton, while Clinton outlined a party platform that contained many of Sanders’ signature items. The event was aimed at conveying a sense of unity in the Democratic Party and it generated a lot of national media attention. In the social media age, there is no summer slowdown in presidential elections because people can take their media with them. Thus, even though television viewing may decline, the ability to educate the voters about a political product may now be better because of social media and smart phones that make politics portable.

The next major focusing event is the convention. Conventions are a marketing and brand education opportunity par excellence because they provide a long duration marketing event during which the
public can be quickly educated about the party’s brand, candidate, and their political offering. Further, the convention offers the opportunity for both candidates to show off their managerial competence; something people look for when picking a presidential candidate. The latter was a problem for both major party candidates. Trump seemed to stumble throughout his convention, while Clinton had issues around the role of the party chair in securing her nomination from the outset of hers. The Democrats were able to recover as their event went along and did a better job presenting the public with an image of managerial competence and a variety of political products that aligned with voting blocs the Democrats usually win and could win in this particular cycle. Trump’s political products and endorsers did not produce a big convention bounce and many observers argued they did not help to unify the party. Not surprisingly, Trump made a series of campaign staff changes shortly after the convention.

The conventions also provide the candidate and party with an opportunity to demonstrate their competence. The problem for both parties with this was that it only somewhat happened. The Democrats had the issue of the way in which the party organization, and its chair, clearly advocated on behalf of Clinton in the primaries. While this caused a lot of angst for Sanders supporters, the job of the party and its chair is to nominate the best available candidate; something one can say occurred with the nomination of Clinton. The Republican convention was equally unconvincing as far as the latter goes. Trump’s messaging was almost entirely negative as would fit his argument that the country needed to be made great again. Clinton, on the other hand, seemed to start out too far to the left, then proceeded to run a convention that made the Democrats the more centerist choice. These events showed the voters a clear contrast between the two candidates in terms of what their offers and brand were, but also what their managerial style was while attracting the kind of media attention that could, at least superficially, engage voters during those lazy days of summer.

The last big focusing events are the series of presidential debates still to be held. The debates offer voters a head to head comparison between political products and give both candidates a chance to get their message out to the public in an unfiltered way. The debates use a variety of formats, including the joint press conference, the town hall and, even on occasion, the candidates questioning each other. Usually there are a series of presidential debates and a single vice-presidential debate. These are excellent focusing events because they feature a direct confrontation that is always competitive and this is something that the public loves. Plus, given that these run on live television, there is always the possibility for some kind of mistake that reveals the lack of fitness a candidate has for office. Examples include: then President Ford saying that Poland was not under Soviet domination in a debate with Jimmy Carter in 1976; George H.W. Bush looking down at his watch and
misunderstanding a question during a town hall format debate in 1992 with Bill Clinton; and Ross Perot and Mitt Romney’s “binders full of women” comments in the 2012 debate with Barack Obama. The potential for disaster and brand building has only been underscored by the rise of social media. In 2012, Romney’s above comment, and his comment about the events in Benghazi, became social media sensations, while in earlier cycles they would have most likely just blended into the scenery of a long presidential campaign and into the noise generated by thousands of other candidates and ballot questions across this vast, fractious, noisy land.

This election cycle is entering the key stage. As is usually the case in a country like this, the polls ebb and flow seemingly on a daily basis at the presidential level, but there are many very competitive elections for state legislatures, governorships, the entire United States House of Representatives and key Senate seats. All of these candidates are running marketing and branding campaigns that are very important to what the next president will be able to do once in office. These races too are worth watching and their outcomes are very important to the life of the nation.

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Trends in Political Marketing

Political Podcasts: what do they mean for political marketing?

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Political podcasts
As someone who has sampled around 30 different politics related podcast series (currently subscribing to a mere 18 of them), I feel I have a pretty good grip on the types of political podcasts floating around iTunes, SoundCloud, and various other online platforms. Most are hosted by journalists from online or multiplatform media outlets (Politico, Slate, NPR) or former political operatives (David Axerod, Jon Favreau, Mike Murphy). However, one recent addition to the list of political podcast series might add another category to the list at the end of this piece.

The campaign run podcast
On 13 August 2016 a new political podcast series released its first episode. Given my unhealthily high level of political podcast consumption, this normally would not be a marquee event. But what made this release different was that, despite being hosted by small business owner Max Linsky, the author in the podcast details
was Hillary Clinton. To quote Colleen Shalby of the LA Times, "The Clinton campaign has ventured into the world of podcasting."

As far as I am aware, With Her is the first podcast series run by a political campaign. Given the Clintons' somewhat standoffish relationship with the media, this move is not surprising. Rather than going through podcasts such as the Glenn Thrush (Senior Staff Writer for Politico Magazine) hosted Off Message, which Hillary Clinton has been on before, With Her gives the Clinton campaign another unfiltered online avenue to directly promote their cause.

Judging from the content of the first three episodes, listeners are not going to get answers to any hard hitting questions. Topics covered by Linsky, Clinton and Vice Presidential Candidate Tim Kaine so far include: when they wake up, how they stay focused, and the importance of friends on the campaign trail. In sum, the content suggests the main goal of the series is to make Hillary Clinton and those in her campaign circle seem more relatable.

But to whom? Who is listening to this series? Given the fact that podcasts have to be actively retrieved (in the form of subscribing, going to a website, searching Google), my guess is that - like most political podcasts - the listenership is going to be made up primarily of people with a vested interest in politics. In this particular case, the listener is likely to already be a Clinton supporter. So my main question specifically regarding this new podcast is simple, what is the end goal? Reputation/brand management? Get more votes? Push a single of a collection of messages?

The broader questions
With Her signals a potential new era where podcasts are "mainstream" enough that they become another online tool for political campaigning. What does that mean for political marketing, both in practice and research? In practice, could podcasts be used by campaigns in a similar manner to Facebook, Twitter and/or campaign websites? Given the likely listenership, could they be used to less formally motivate volunteers, donors, and to help give a politician or government's agenda momentum? In research, with so many political practitioners either being interviewed on or hosting podcasts, is there any reason that the information they

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contain could be seen as less reliable or valid than other secondary interview?

This piece raises more questions than gives answers. That said, if political podcasting is about to enter into what we may call "the mainstream of online political activity", these are questions that should be looked into further.

**Political podcast categories**

Most political podcasts (excluding the Clinton campaign’s) fall into more than one category of the following categories.

**Radio update podcasts**

Normally lifted directly from radio broadcasts, these often shorter podcasts (5-15 minutes) wrap up the daily/weekly news. See: RNZ: Focus on Politics; RN Breakfast - Government and Politics.

**News of the week podcasts**

These podcasts (45-60 minutes) normally wrap up the weekly news with a host and panel giving personal perspectives on the topics discussed. See: The Guardian UK - Politics Weekly; NPR Politics Podcast; Keepin it 1600.

**Themed podcasts**

These often weekly podcasts (20-60 minutes) cover a particular theme prevalent in the preceding, month, or over the course of an ongoing campaign. See: The Run-Up; Slate's Trumpcast; FiveThirtyEight Elections.

**Policy podcasts**

These often weekly podcasts (45-60 minutes) cover 2-3 different more policy or administrative topics that are likely too ‘inside-the-beltway’ (to quote one podcast series' bio) for most people. See: So That Happened; The Weeds Podcast.

**Personal story podcasts**

These often weekly podcasts (60-90 minutes) normally involve a host (nonamilly a journalist or former political operative) having a conversation with a political figure (politician, diplomat, famous activist) about their life inside and outside the political arena. See: Off Message; The Axe Files; Radio Free GOP.
Measuring Fieldwork

Performance measurement is central to a rapidly emerging form of election campaigning in Australia known as data-driven fieldwork.

This campaign activity - also called Obama-style micro-targeting - combines the older traditions of grassroots community organising and personal narrative still-emerging applications of digital information and communications technologies, in order to achieve ever more efficient targeting of messages at persuadable voters. It is both capital- and labour-intensive.

Measuring the work of campaign staff, volunteers, and candidates, is inherently problematic. But one of the distinctive features of data-driven fieldwork is its use of – and, you could say, its obsessive compulsion about – performance metrics.

Just as Obama’s 2008 campaign manager, David Plouffe, pored over spread sheets - he wanted to discern ‘how many of a field officer’s volunteer shifts had been filled last weekend? How much money did that fund-raising blast bring in?’ – So Australian campaign managers are trying to measure the effectiveness of volunteer campaign work. [http://www.thevictorylab.com/](http://www.thevictorylab.com/)

Likewise, in the analysis of the Obama for America organisation by Elizabeth McKenna and Hahrie Han, ‘metrics defined and assessed how well everyone - from the most senior staff to the most junior volunteers - were meeting their responsibilities.’

“Throughout the campaign, Chicago headquarters established voter contact goals for each state, region, neighbourhood team, and volunteer shift - and held staff and volunteers at each level strictly accountable to those numbers... (T)he campaign used metrics to communicate and implement its strategy, to provide clarity to each team about what its role was, and to ensure that all local activity added up to a larger shared purpose.”

Australia’s recent double dissolution campaign set a high water mark for this style of campaigning in Australia, with no fewer than six separate fieldwork campaigns, conducted by two political parties, two independent candidates and two third-party organisations.

So what did these Australian campaigns do?

To help answer this question, as part of a wider study of fieldwork campaigning in Australian elections, this blog pulls together the claims made by the various campaign organisations about their fieldwork efforts in the recent campaign. (The data comes from a variety of scattered sources, and there are still a few gaps, so additions and corrections are welcome.)

Let’s look first at the Labor Party, which over the last five years has invested more time and effort than any other Australian party in building and testing its fieldwork capacity at federal and state elections.

Two weeks into the eight-week campaign, Labor’s director of target seats, Paul Erikson, emailed supporters to claim Labor already had more than 5000 volunteers in the field. They had knocked on more than 80,000 doors and made more than 140,000 phone calls to voters. These numbers suggest the ALP had been recruiting and training its volunteers, equipping them with scripts and placing them in relevant locations, over a long pre-campaign period.

Erikson’s email was promoting the target announced at that time by Opposition Leader Bill Shorten’s for Labor’s fieldwork campaign. Shorten wanted ‘one million conversations with Australians by election day’ – an impressive but not overly ambitious target. Labor in 2013 had reported making 1.2 million phone calls and 250,000 doorknocks (Professionals p245). By early June Erikson reported ‘conversations’ had 500,000 and by the end of the 2016 campaign, Labor had easily reached the target.

At the first caucus meeting of the new parliament Shorten reported to Labor MPs that 162,000 volunteers had worked on the campaign at different times, “knocking on over half a million doors and making more than 1.6 million phone calls.”

On fundraising, ALP national secretary George Wright emailed supporters on 29 June that Labor had hit its target of $1m in ‘grassroots online donations.’ Over 13,000 individual donors had made an average donation of $48. This compared to around $800,000 raised this way in 2013.

The Australian Greens, the other political party to mount a data-driven fieldwork campaign, described 2016 as the biggest campaign they had ever run. I have not been able to trace published fieldwork metrics that would flesh out that statement. A flavour is provided by the post-election survey of volunteers conducted by the Western Australian Greens, which estimated 25,000 “volunteer hours” were donated in fieldwork tasks such as doorknocking, telephone calling and data entry.

Of the third-party campaigners, the trade union movement again mounted a significant fieldwork effort - separate from, though parallel to, the Labor’s Party’s campaign. In early June, with another month of the campaign still to run, ACTU
secretary Dave Oliver claimed 20,000 volunteers and 750,000 phone calls.³

By the end of the campaign, the ACTU reported having ‘conversations with 46,102 union members who were swinging voters’, of whom 33,191 were ‘convinced’ to put the Liberals last. In the final 48 hours of the campaign, ACTU volunteers distributed one million replica Medicare cards.⁴

Compared to these behemoth numbers, other fieldwork efforts seem skinner.

In a jubilant post-election YouTube video Paul Oosting, the national director of activist group GetUp, reports 3736 volunteers were mobilised to campaign in twelve seats held by ‘hard right’ Liberal MPs. They donated a total of 17,741 hours work, including 735 volunteers who filled 600 ‘calling shifts’ in ‘community phone banks’.⁵

Together with doorknockers and others, these volunteers conducted 45,000 conversations with voters in target seats, Oosting reported. Of these, 27,000 conversations took place in the seats of Dickson (held by Immigration Minister Peter Dutton) and Bass (held by whip Andrew Nikolic). GetUp’s engagement director Darren Loasby is quoted claiming 17,000 calls were made in Bass.⁶

On election day, GetUp staffed 450 booths and handed out 1.1 million How to Vote cards. Oosting also said 36,000 GetUp members had ‘chipped in’ to the campaign but did not disclose any dollar amounts.

Finally, two rural independents again mounted their own volunteer fieldwork efforts: Cathy McGowan in the seat of Indi and Tony Windsor in New England. McGowan’s first campaign to wrest Indi from the Liberals in 2013 had been a classic of the style, deploying 700 volunteers through ‘kitchen table conversations’, local community-level team organisation, intensive social media activity, web-based volunteer recruitment and crowdfunding more than $117,000 in small donations.⁷

In seeking re-election McGowan repeated the pattern; her website shows more than 250 volunteers signed up for activities including phonebanking, doorknocking, and fundraising. McGowan and Windsor – as well as Greens MP Adam Bandt – all used the US digital platform NationBuilder to run their campaign website. NationBuilder allows campaigns to run an

⁵ [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r859isw2IE8](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r859isw2IE8)
integrated database handling volunteer recruitment, doorknocking, fundraising and social media.\(^8\)

In summary, then, these performance metrics address three sets of campaign activities: How many volunteers were in the field? What did they do? (In particular, how many ‘conversations’ did they have on doorsteps or phone calls, and with whom?) And how much money was raised from supporters?

The repeated emphasis on ‘conversations’ is no accident. All the fieldwork campaigners express their confidence in the efficacy of face-to-face conversations with voters and, in the spirit of Marshall Ganz, their faith in winning an uphill us-versus-them contest\(^9\):

“We don’t have the money of the old parties, but we do have people power. ... We know that conversations are the most powerful way to connect with people and to shift perspectives on the issues that we care about”\(^10\)

“We may not have the big money that The Nationals have, but we do have a network of dedicated locals who want to see New England independent again. We need volunteers to help with ... having conversations with voters about what we can achieve with an Independent New England”\(^11\)

“It’s simple really. Conversations win votes, votes win seats, and we’re just 21 seats short of a government ...” (ALP email, 21 May)

Of course, none of these metrics by themselves prove that this form of campaigning ‘works’, or that it’s more or less effective at winning votes than, say, television advertising or direct mail. The fact that the winners of the 2016 elections, the Liberal and National parties, did not conduct data-driven fieldwork suggests at least that there is no single strategy to electoral victory. Equally, however, the apparently widespread faith in the ability of volunteers to win campaigns marks a potentially significant point in Australian elections and political life.

\(^8\) http://nationbuilder.com/software_for_political_campaigns


\(^10\) http://www.adambandt.com/volunteer

\(^11\) http://www.tonywindsor2016.com/volunteer
Why Georgian Political Parties are not sustainable? Maybe Georgia needs monarchy?

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The past of Georgian political parties is an interesting source to try to answer the question: Why once victorious Georgian Political Parties are not sustainable organizations? Why they come to power and then disappear? What is happening?

In the 20th Century Georgia won independence twice - once in 1918 and once in 1990. When the National Council of Georgia was formed by Georgia’s major political parties in 1917, it issued the Declaration of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Georgia on May 26, 1918.

The Georgian Social Democratic Party dominated power in this National Council. Another 15 political parties went to Constituent Assembly, elected in 1919. From 130 seats, 109 seats were under the Social Democratic Party of Georgia, the National-Democratic Party of Georgia owned 8 seats, the Socialist Federalist Party owned 8 seats and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party owned 5.

How were these parties born?

- The Social-Democrats were very popular. Georgian Marxists held their first conference in 1892. They in their program recognized neither nation, nor democracy. Their leaders in their newspaper “Kvali” (into English “Path”, translation of author) denied the national ideas, so the social democrats wanted a communist empire.

- The Liberal Movement of Georgia and its leader - Georgian writer, Prince Ilia Chavchavadze, who intended to maintain national values and liberal ideas for a better future, had established the National-Democratic Party in 1906. Being leader of the national feelings and democratic values, this party was organized over their newspaper “Iveria”. The ideology of Georgian capitalism was encouraged by journal “Moambe”.

- The Georgian Socialist-Federalist Party was established in Geneva in 1904. To reestablish of Georgian National Country, they had the goal of Georgian Socialist-Federalists.

In 1921 Soviet red army invaded and occupied Georgia. As a part of Soviet Union - Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic accepted only one political power – the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. But this party also disappeared in 1991 after the demise of Soviet Union. At which point Georgia declared independence.
In 1991, Zviad Gamsakhurdia became Georgia’s first elected president. He was leader of the alliance of newborn political organizations named “Round Table”. But the life span of this alliance was also short. In January 1992, the President as his “Round Table” were deposed in a coup led by one “thief-in-law” (criminal boss) and his gangs. Eduard Shevardnadze, former foreign minister of Soviet Union, was invited to rule the country. A new party led by Shevardnadze, the Citizen’s Union of Georgia (CUG), won control of Parliament in the 1995 Elections. But this political organization dyed quickly. On 4 January 2004 the leader of the United Nationalist Movement, the leader of the Rose Revolution, having dismissed Eduard Shevardnadze, was elected as Georgia’s new president with 96 percent of the popular vote. The new president was 35 years old at that time. His political organization was called the “United National Movement”. He started rapid reforms, defeated corruption and bribe. But Georgian democratic reforms were unpopular in the neighbouring Russia, waiting for momentum to crash the country. In 2008, when Georgians tried to retake their own city from the hands of rebels, the Russian Army invaded Georgia. The angry opposition parties were calling President Saakashvili to resign. In the horizon of the political market appeared a new man, a Russian made billionaire Mr. Bidzina Ivanishvili, who established a new political organisation, “Georgian Dream”. He won the Parliament Elections in 2012.

According the historical analysis of Georgian political parties, the research has some working hypothesis, should be once again checked by pilot qualitative research:

➢ Well known historical geo-political tensions, backed by economic and social instability, make once victorious political alliances and parties perish physically and socially.

➢ Political organisations in Georgia, easily losing their relevance through social changes and economic disasters, show their macro/micro problems to survive.

If usual unsustainability of Georgian politics will be confirmed, we can have the second research hypothesis:

➢ Unsustainable Georgian political market can be strengthening by new democratic institution, what can be constitutional Georgian Monarchy – having 1000 years old tradition in this country.
Other News

Teaching The Practice of Politics:
an online library of teaching resources for embedding employability in politics and IR

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Students, parents, employers and governments are increasingly interested in employability: a degree by itself is not enough to get a student a job, and it certainly isn’t enough to ensure they get the best job that enables them to practise what they have learnt at university both effectively and ethically. However employability was not on the agenda when most of the academics now teaching at universities were undergraduates themselves so it is hard to imagine how to teach in a practical or applied way.

Teaching The Practice of Politics is a free library of teaching resources to teach employability in politics & IR – see www.coursesites.com/s/_TeachingPractice ofPolitics. It has power-point slides, workshop handouts, workshop preparation, group exercises, assessment ideas; sample syllabi; teaching tips; and resources including adverts for jobs in politics and IR, links to media and practitioner articles and videos and relevant academic literature.

Introduction

Welcome to Teaching The Practice of Politics!

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‘This is very impressive’ (Dr. Simon Lightfoot University of Leeds, UK)

‘A great contribution to encouraging and facilitating the teaching of the Practice of Politics.’ (Dr. Ed Bacon, Birbeck University, UK)

‘The world of PoliSci teaching owes you a tremendous debt for curating this fabulous collection...The teaching resources are FANTASTIC.’ (Associate Professor Laura J Sheppard, UNSW, Australia)

Created by Jennifer Lees-Marshment at The University of Auckland, it also offers teaching tips and advice, arguments to help make the case for teaching applied politics and IR; and information about how students react to the course. To access, go to the ‘Teaching the Practice of Politics’ website www.coursesites.com/s/_TeachingPracticeofPolitics and click Self-Enrol. If you already have a CourseSites account, you can choose to log in with your existing account or you can create a new account.

Users can adapt material for their own version of this course or use resources on just one topic or section to integrate applied teaching into an existing course or offer a stand-alone, non-assessed workshop.

There are four main sections of resources covering:

- **Working in Politics and IR:** This explores the motivations for working in politics and IR; skills gained from a politics and IR degree; the range and nature of jobs related to politics and IR; the highs and lows of working in politics and IR; work life balance; job satisfaction; and individual suitability for different jobs.

- **Careers in Politics and IR:** This covers personal brand or skills audit and development plans; applying for jobs in politics and IR; interviewing for jobs in politics; and networking.

- **Effective Practice in Politics and IR:** This is about skills - workplace writing such as writing memos, advisory reports, best practice reports, policy briefs; and communication skills including media, presentation, listening, relationship building; and team work and leadership.

- **Ethical Practice in Politics and IR:** This covers ethical behaviour in the workplace; supporting diversity; and balancing principle and pragmatism to achieve change in politics and IR.
New Political Marketing Group Website
https://politicalmarketinggroup.wordpress.com/

The Political Marketing Group has a new website, which can be found at https://politicalmarketinggroup.wordpress.com/. The new website is easy on the eye and easy to navigate.

The new website includes:
- Information about the PMG
- A list of the PMG Committee
- Call for papers
- Events and conferences
- A complete archive of the PMG newsletter
- An extensive collection of book reviews
- Links to the PMG Facebook page and political-marketing.org
- A list of the PMG country coordinators
- 31 country specific pages, each including information such as: that particular country's PMG coordinator; resources; and useful links.
The Palgrave Studies in Political Marketing and Management new book series is looking for more book proposals to add to its’ exciting collection so far.

The series publishes high quality and ground-breaking academic research in Palgrave Pivot form (25-50,000 words, 12 week publishing time frame upon receipt of final manuscript) and have a practice/practitioner element.

At its core, Political Marketing and Management is about how politicians, governments, political staff, parties and campaigns use marketing and management tools and concepts to design and achieve their goals. Scholarship is drawn from a range of disciplines and fields, and covers how political organisations and actors strategise, lead, organise and market, as well as intersections between these aspects such as the organisation of political marketing research in government department; the importance of leadership in changing how a party is organised; the organisational structure of volunteers within an NGO; strategic communication in political movements; resource management in political offices; and the strategic organisation of fundraising in campaigns.

There are already an exciting and diverse range of books in the series. Books published or in press include:


- **Marketing Leadership in Government: communicating responsiveness, leadership and credibility** by Edward Elder
Books contracted include *Public Opinion and the Management of Governance in the Major English Speaking Democracies* by Scott Bennett; *Political Marketing and Management in Ghana: A New Architecture* edited by Kobby Mensah; and *Gender and Political Marketing in the United States* by Minita Sanghvi.

We would welcome new ideas for potential books – please get in touch. We would particularly welcome books on recent/forthcoming elections such as US 2016; Australia 2016; Canada 2015 and so on, but are also very keen on exploring new areas, and of course want to support books on political management (organisation, leadership, political HRM, planning, and reviewing or monitoring) not just political marketing.

The series is contracted for both politics and management lists. For further details about the series see https://leesmarshment.wordpress.com/pmm-book-series/ and Palgrave’s page http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14601.

### Submitting a proposal

Proposals can be submitted to the series editor on j.lees-marshment@auckland.ac.nz at any time. We recommend you read the full guidelines for the series, and get in touch with the series editor in advance of completing the proposal to discuss ideas first.

All books must:
- be between 25,000 and 50,000 words.
- be empirical not just theoretical.
- have recommendations for practice derived from the academic research.

And we encourage books to:
- include other practitioner elements such as those noted in the section on format.
- include international material or relate work to international trends.

Call for New Items for Upcoming PMG Newsletters

We want to facilitate information transfer between all members, including political marketing scholars, practitioners and experts. Member’s active participation is essential to making this newsletter successful. The PMG newsletter provides you with the opportunity to communicate with political marketing scholars, practitioners and experts. If you have anything you would like included in a PMG newsletter (being released in March, June, and September) please send it to Edward Elder at eeld001@aucklanduni.ac.nz. Items that may be included may be, but not exclusive to, recently released or upcoming books, upcoming events and conferences, career or scholarship opportunities, or any articles about recent elections, trends and academic findings. **The next deadline for submissions is 15 March 2017**